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State-capitalism is an economic system in which governments 
manipulate market outcomes for political purposes. Governments 
embrace state-capitalism because it serves political as well as economic 
purposes—not because it’s the most efficient means of generating 
prosperity. This paper examines the institutional, economic and social 
combination in which state-capitalism is possible and contributes to 
prosperity. It is argues that state-capitalism works best under 
authoritarian rule because there is no constituency to provide for. 
However, this article also argues that state-capitalism has fundamental 
flaws. 
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1. Introduction 
“We are all state-capitalists now” was the title of an article 
published in 2012 by Niall Fergusson in Foreign Policy. Even if he 
tries to make a completely different point, it is still a widespread 
feeling in many western countries that state-capitalism may be the 
way to go. Germany’s new energy strategy (“Energiewende”) 
inhales the same state-capitalistic air than France’s industry policy 
(“entreprises nationales strategiques”). Even such countries with a 
well-established pedigree of free-marketism like the US and 
Switzerland are embarking on a state-capitalistic journey. In the 
US, the public sector accounts for around 39 percent of GDP, in 
Switzerland, the public sector grew by almost 10 percent in the 
years 2010-2012 (2012 Index of Economic Freedom by The 
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However, the inverse might also be claimed: capitalism never stopped being 
state-capitalistic. The British East-India Company, modern-day Korean and 
Japanese conglomerates or European oil companies always had a state-
partnership or some sort of exclusivity contract with a sovereign body. Even 
seemingly free-market institutions like airlines and banks can somehow be 
classed as state-capitalistic, at least when central governments or central banks 
come to secure these “too big to fail” enterprises. 
Since this question is raised: Some countries seem to do well with state-
capitalism (Japan) whereas others seem to have difficulties with it (Brazil). 
Might there be different types of state-capitalism? Might there be different 
recipients of it? Is it possible that this system works well at a stage of a 
country’s development but not at another? This article intends to explore these 
questions. In a first section, the meaning of “state-capitalism” will be explored, 
then, it will be analyzed how far state-capitalism works, or in other words, a 
framework for this analysis will be developed. In the last section, a crucial 
question will be answered, namely to whom state-capitalism can be a 
challenge. 
It will be claimed first that there is no unique phenomenon that can count as 
state-capitalistic, second that state-capitalism has its most positive outcomes 
under authoritarian rule, third that even its best outcomes still can develop into 
problems and fourth that the real challenge is how to escape state-capitalism. 
This paper is written from an Austrian-at-large perspective emphasizing the 
problem of dispersion of information in the markets and therefore the 
epistemic qualities of the market-actors. 
 
2. State-capitalism defined 
Jan Pieterszoon Coen, the Dutch pioneer in colonizing Java wrote bluntly to 
the directors of the United East India Company in the early 17th century: “We 
cannot carry on trade without war or war without trade.” And so, the nexus 
between government and business reached its high point during the Opium 
Wars of the 19th century, when British merchants craving new markets in the 
Chinese hinterland repeatedly lobbied their country’s politicians into punitive 
assaults on China (Findlay & O’Rourke 2009). 
But the US, too, quickly learned from Europe. Nurturing local industries 
under highly protectionist regimes was normal in by the end of the 19th 
century. Not only this, mercantilism influenced some presidents: Woodrow 
Wilson no less than Theodore Roosevelt knew that American goods and capital 
must urgently find markets beyond national borders. “Since trade,” Wilson 
argued in 1907, “ignores national boundaries and the manufacturer insists on 
having the world as a market, the flag of his nation must follow him, and the 
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doors of the nations which are closed must be battered down.” (Beaudreau 
2004: 116).  
Following a theme of his time, Wilson sounds as if he wanted to make the 
world safe for American goods and capital rather than prepare the globe for 
democracy. Then, the influential German-American economist Friedrich List 
had already rejected Adam Smith’s free-trade theory as unsuitable for the 19th 
century conditions of rivalry and inequality between nation-states. List, who 
may have been influenced during his journey to the U.S. by Alexander 
Hamilton’s economic nationalism, also thought that laissez-faire capitalism had 
a built-in bias in favor of the trading interests of Britain, which had 
industrialized ahead of all other countries, and then – according to his views – 
threatened to undermine the nascent factories in the other European nations. 
Most importantly, List was a fervent admirer of the French mercantilists who 
wanted to close France to imports but to open all other ports for French exports. 
On a side-note, it has to be remarked that List was also a fervent supporter of 
national expansion urging Prussia-Germany to “go east” and colonize Hungary 
and Austria to push for south-east Europe (List 1928). 
Mercantilism, under its original name or using more sympathetic labels has 
been present ever since. In Europe, sectors like energy or social services are 
state-led or –owned, whereas heavy industries have been appropriating foreign 
ministries and using them as worldwide lobbyists. Governments, on the other 
hand, appropriated big enterprises through meticulous regulation turning them 
into national champions with two main tasks: export goods and secure 
homeland jobs. In South America, state involvement in the economy never 
diminished. Nationalizations in Venezuela, Argentina and Bolivia co-exist with 
the Brazilian model in which the state takes the role of a shareholder in national 
industries. In Asia, different models emerged. Singapore turned the whole 
state-apparatus into a for-profit company while Japan developed a strategy of 
out-pacing the West. This meant, first to export cheap goods, to accumulate 
capital, to use this capital for developing new technology and then to export 
advanced goods at a good price. How was this development made possible? 
With mercantilist policies involving import quotas, special treatment by the 
government of those firms in developing new technology, cheap bank loans, 
and the government itself creating new companies among other measures. This 
model was adapted by Korea, Taiwan and, ultimately, China. Most of these 
Asian state-capitalists ironically received much assistance from the U.S. as it 
pursued its geopolitical interests, boosting local economies through wars in 
Korea and Vietnam, foreign aid, and its open markets (Hollingsworth &Boyer 
1999). 
In other words, state-capitalism seems to be present in recent history as well 
as in the contemporary world. It has the ability of disguise itself and take many 
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forms, therefore, state-capitalism is not only about national industries, state-
backed national champions, and more modernly, of sovereign wealth funds. 
There are more nuanced ways of mingling. 
When approaching the subject of state-capitalism many disclaimers are 
warranted. The most important being that it is impossible to completely avoid 
situations in which government starts working as, through or with private 
enterprises. This, however, is not just a statement about actual state of affairs, 
but seems to describe an a priori situation of markets. A stable market needs 
stable rules which normally translate in a “rule of law”. Where there is law, 
there is a state, and so, there is no capitalism without the state. Perhaps, the 
state as economic actor is naturally entrenched in the nature of non-anarchic 
capitalism. The second disclaimer is: In the world of economics, all agents are 
economic actors; therefore, if there is a state, it will act as an agent in the 
market. 
State-capitalism can occur under a number of aliases, for example state run-
enterprises, state-owned enterprises, public-private-partnerships, a policy in 
favor of national champions, the state as a minority shareholder, special 
regulations for specific activities, subsidies, protectionism, sovereign wealth 
funds or even the European style welfare state. The list is long and can go on. 
The differential is, however, how much impact state-capitalism has over the 
economy of a country. Recent surveys (Economist Intelligence Unit 2011) 
calculate the share of national or state controlled enterprises capitalization on 
the MSCI national stock-market index as 80 percent in China, 62 percent in 
Russia and 38 percent in Brazil. The OECD average is around 12 percent. The 
same survey shows that four out of the ten biggest global listed companies by 
revenue are under direct state control (Sinopec, China National Petroleum 
Corporation, StateGrid and Japan Post holdings). Five are national champions 
strongly favored by their home countries (Royal Dutch Shell, Exxon Mobil, BP, 
Toyota and Chevron). Out of them, only one is not by any definition a state 
capitalistic institution, ironically, it is the largest, Wal Mart. 
In short, every intervention of the state in the economy in order to allow an 
advantage of a firm or a group of companies over others can be taken as state-
capitalistic behavior. Usually, these actions advantage big corporations over 
small and medium-sized enterprises. However, if state-capitalism is defined 
even more loosely than pointed here, then other questions arise. For example, is 
each regulation by the state as such an act of state-capitalism? It may count as 
one, if the state – through the exercise of his regulatory powers – benefits a set 
of enterprises over others. It could even count as a state-capitalistic intervention 
if the lawmaker isn’t aware of this effect. For example, Switzerland is revising 
its competition law outlawing some types of cooperation between enterprises. 
Through this, vertical integration is benefited, since only cooperating 
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companies are addressed by this law and vertically integrated companies not 
(Baldi 2012). Skepticism might now argue that this is just an unintended 
consequence of a law, not state-capitalism per se. However, since the definition 
of state-capitalism must allow for nuances, is can be used also to cover these – 
far-fetched – actions. 
Here, the scope of the definition will be reduced and state-capitalism will be 
broadly defined as a type of action by the state, in which the state either 
directly or indirectly becomes an entrepreneur or favors a given or groups of 
enterprises. If this definition is to be broadened even more, than all economic 
intervention of the state has to count as state-capitalism. This, on the one hand, 
would make the very term obsolete. On the other hand, it denotes a fact that 
business cannot happen without being regulated by some sort of government 
and therefore capitalism is always in a deep relationship with the state. In other 
words, some sort of state-capitalism seems always to take place. 
Martin & Thelen (2007: 4) even claim that the state “(1) has an impact on the 
strategic interests of government bureaucrats, by expanding their interests in 
improving the skills of the long-term unemployed, (2) expands the capacities of 
bureaucrats to construct political coalitions of private sector groups to support 
state policies, and (3) alters the strategic interests of private actors. In short, we 
argue that the relative power and distinctive interests of the state are crucial 
factors in sustaining particular varieties of coordination across time within 
countries.” 
These discussions may be fruitful, but they miss a core idea of state-
capitalism. It is used not because it is the most efficient way of producing and 
distributing goods, but because it serves political aims. Often, state-capitalist 
policies are employed in order to secure jobs, advance a geostrategic position, 
and maintain industries considered crucial for the development of a country 
and so on. The economic rationality that is at the center of the concept of 
capitalism (maximization of efficiency in a learning process of discovery by the 
markets) is abandoned if the state prioritizes political outcomes over the 
processes of markets. Political aims are naturally outcomes but the logic of 
capitalism focusses on the process to create outcomes (which cannot be 
established before the process takes place). 
Capitalism lets demand and supply establish one or more equilibrium in 
different markets – state-capitalism defines the outcome to be reached and 
wants supply and demand to adjust to it. No market agent is able to certainly 
foresee the results of market-engagement. Only because of this “epistemic 
insufficiency” success, failure, different prices, cooperation any many more 
elements are possible. A market can only be accounted for its situation in the 
moment it is observed. Neither its development nor its results are stable and 
therefore, they are not foreseeable. State-capitalism goes for the inverse, 
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foreseeable, clear-cut outcomes that can be planned or influenced by the state-
agent. 
In order to sum up this first section, it may be stated that state-capitalism is 
an economic system in which governments manipulate market outcomes for 
political purposes. Governments embrace state-capitalism because it serves 
political as well as economic purposes—not because it’s the most efficient 
means of generating prosperity. State-capitalism is often diminished capitalism 
and enlarged state-action.  
How does it work? In the next section, the inner mechanisms of state-
capitalism will be described. 
 
3. How does State-capitalism work 
State-capitalism works on different levels. In this section, the theoretical, 
economic and social framework of state-capitalism will be analyzed. For the 
purpose of brevity, China will be treated as a primary example. The reason for 
using the Middle-Kingdom as example becomes apparent after a first look to 
some data on the Chinese market: In 2009, China Mobile and China National 
Petroleum Corporation – both state-owned – scored a combined profit of 33 
billion US-Dollars which is more than the sum of the 500 most profitable 
Chinese firms. In 2002 the total assets of the 121 biggest Chinese state-owned 
enterprises were worth 230 billion US-Dollars, by 2009 they had reached to 2.9 
trillion. As of 2009, some 85 percent of the 1.4 trillion US-Dollar bank loans in 
China went to state-owned enterprises. However, the average return on assets 
by state-owned enterprises was 0.7 percent, for Chinese small and medium-
sized companies, this number was about 6.2 percent (McGregor 2012). 
After a decade of retreating share of state-owned enterprises on the Chinese 
economy, this decline shows signs of halt. Experts agree on the state making up 
a third to half of the Chinese economic output, although they also admit that 
the number of state-owned enterprises decreased from around 680000 in the 
nineties to some 114000 in 2010, some 100 of them centrally controlled national 
champions. However, the same experts are quick in pointing out that first, this 
number has been stable for the last two years, and second the sheer number of 
state-controlled enterprises is not the only indicator on state-capitalism. 
Market reforms were strong as China entered the World Trade Organization 
in 2001, but slowed after 2006, and were even reversed with stimulus spending 
in and after 2008. Since state-owned enterprises were the main receivers of 
fiscal stimuli, their average industrial output rose from six times that of the 
average private firm in 2004 to 11 times as much in 2010. In addition, state-
owned enterprises enjoy a range of advantages. In return for guaranteed profits 
and state backing, official banks lend to state-owned enterprises at a third of 
the cost of credit available to private companies (those that can get official loans 
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at all). The government showers a range of tax breaks and subsidies on state 
firms, and favors them in procurement contracts. Not having to pay for their 
land is a subsidy worth some 4 trillion Yuan Renminbi (640 billion US-Dollars) 
in the timeframe from 2001 to 2009. And of course, there is no intervention by 
antitrust regulators on state-owned companies. 
Another advantage is the setting of industry standards. In the EU, in the US 
and even in Japan, standards are usually drafted by industry bodies after wide 
consultation, and not tied to the right to sell products. In China the opposite 
often happens. Whether in data protocols for mobile telephony or the technical 
specifications for electric-vehicle recharging, China has chosen to go its own 
way in a manner that confers advantage to domestic firms. Foreign firms are 
typically not consulted, whereas local companies help write the rules (data 
above from McGregor 2012 and World Bank 2012). 
After this introductory example of state-capitalism, this section is exploring 
its theoretical foundations, economic agenda as well as social enablers. 
 
3.1. Theoretical framework 
According to Bergsager (2009, a proponent of state-capitalism at least in the 
energy sector) the institutional framework of state-capitalism is primarily based 
on two overlapping theories, neo-mercantilism and Institutional Political 
Economy. It is appropriate to stress them as overlapping since similar policy 
principles in theory can be derived from both of these theoretical frameworks. 
Many commentators would emphasize that neo-mercantilism is the best 
theoretical framework for understanding for example the Chinese version of 
state-capitalism, using state-run or state-owned enterprises in a strategy of 
“locking up” natural resources or capital throughout the developing world. 
However, this idea of “locking up” moves the attention away from the actual 
relevance of neo-mercantilism to the Chinese growth model, namely the 
Chinese state’s support of promoting long-term growth in the real economy 
through incentives. This idea is derived from the sixteenth-seventeenth century 
European mercantilism’s institutional framework and from Friedrich List’s 
more modern ideas. 
Contemporary neo-mercantilism highlights the importance of a strong 
domestic economy for the security of sustaining a continuous economic 
development in the real economy. Emphasizing this idea, several financial 
incentives are offered to the domestic economy through state intervention, be 
they protectionist trade remedies or state subsidies. Yet, relevant to the 
contemporary growth initiative are the late twentieth and early twenty-first 
centuries’ neo-mercantilist protectionist tools or trade remedies, which can be 
summed up by the following: A favorable monetary policy and the recently 
popularized “safeguard” provisions, antidumping measures and 
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countervailing duties. From this state-capitalist point of view, by actively 
promoting and protecting domestic industry, most notably securing the state-
owned enterprises’ competiveness, the establishment of long-term growth in 
the real economy is achievable. 
Proponents of neo-mercantilism state that the consequence of implementing 
these tools is a more secure and sheltered domestic industry that promotes 
long-term growth, competitive development and a diversified manufacturing 
and industrial sector. As a result, by combining this with a neo-mercantilist 
controlled monetary policy which prevents currency fluctuations, speculations 
and excessive cross-border currency flow, in addition to increased competitive 
advantages to the international market, the aforementioned tools provide a 
semi-free market with the overall purpose of securing domestic long-term 
growth in the real economy as opposed to growth in the financial sector. The 
Chinese attachment to the neo-mercantilist approach is its overall agenda of 
securing the competitiveness and diversification of its industrial and 
manufacturing sector. 
Interestingly, China has not excessively implemented trade remedies of 
“safeguard” provisions, antidumping measures and countervailing duties (to 
the same degree as the European states or the US), but relied on the latter 
policies (World Bank 2012). It is therefore more appropriate to regard the neo-
mercantilist influence on primarily the policies concerning a tightly controlled 
monetary policy and financial system in combination with a subsidization of 
China’s seven core industries, financial institutions and infrastructure 
development industries. 
Institutional Political Economy draws its theoretical basis from the former 
Institutional economics, which to a certain extent presents them both as bodies 
of thought within the theoretical framework of Keynesianism. Important 
Institutional economics’ scholars are Thorstein Veblen, John Kenneth Galbraith 
and John Commons. In contrast to the classical economic doctrine, these 
scholars emphasized the market as just one of numerous institutions involved 
in shaping economic development. The state is given a central role in charge of 
mapping out the rules and regulations beneficial to all institutions within the 
economy to the degree that the end result will be growth in the real economy. 
As a result, the state promotes “an industrial policy aimed at particular 
industries (and firms as their components) to achieve the outcomes that are 
perceived by the state to be efficient for the economy as a whole.” (Chang 
1994). This “favoritism” from the state is based on the necessity of developing 
state-owned enterprises, which will be better explained when mapping out the 
economic principles of state-capitalism below. 
 
3.2. Economic agenda 
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This institutional framework leads to the economic shape of state-capitalism. 
Wallerstein (1974) and more recently Bremmer (2010) developed the argument 
for how to understand state-capitalism economic aims and workings. In a 
nutshell, there are three main points regarding this realm. First, according to 
state-capitalism, a workable financial system must be in place that through 
regulation is able to guide the material self-interest of individuals and 
corporations in pursuing long-term profit goals, and not only increase the 
short-term profits of its shareholders. This correlates with John Kenneth 
Galbraith’s theory: that the financial system should determine price and wage 
levels in order to control inflation. However, this approach should be attributed 
to the state’s responsibility in promoting the objective of full employment. 
Second and still according to the state-capitalist idea, sustaining 
manufacturing is vital for supporting the continued development of high-value 
services. Here, the state’s role is to promote key competitive manufacturing 
sectors, which develop productivity growth and an industrial niche for the 
promotion of international trade and further innovative thinking. However, a 
competitive and diverse manufacturing industry is also emphasized based on 
the lessons drawn from the seemingly insufficiencies of the neo-liberal market 
economy prior to the 2009 financial crisis. Hence, an important task is the 
state’s obligation to provide necessary preconditions for private sector 
development, such as institutions securing the rights and security necessary for 
private enterprises to thrive and develop, combined with a capable banking 
sector willing to support this development. 
Third, governmental interventions should be present in order to encourage 
economic dynamism and stability. Furthermore, through Research and 
development-investment, worker training, risk sharing in projects low on 
private returns but high on social returns, and the protection of “infant” 
industries, the state can increase its industries’ competitive level on the 
international market. 
A common feature shared by the theoretical framework as well as by the 
economic logic of state-capitalism is that the state-planners (are assumed to) 
know not only the results they want to produce but also the dynamic they want 
the markets to operate in order to establish the desired outcomes. I.e. state-
capitalistic logic assigns an epistemic advantage for the state over the market-
agents. While this can be argued for, especially from the institutional 
perspective, there is a second pre-condition for state-capitalism to work: The 
market agents must act in accordance with the plan or at least with the 
incentives. It is assumed that market agents behave alike and share motivations 
as well as epistemic capabilities. In other words, all participants of the market 
share the state’s interests and will not take advantage of the system to benefit 
them or serve to personal self-interest. This goes together with a third tacit 
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assumption, namely, that markets cannot establish themselves but need state-
guidance to do so. This is especially problematic because efficiency is not taken 
into account. If market-agents find a more efficient way to establish an outcome 
that is good for them but perhaps not desirable from the state-perspective, the 
state-capitalistic model does not how to answer to this challenge. 
Economics, however, does not happen outside society and therefore there 
are social implications for state-capitalism. 
 
3.3. Social enablers 
There are, of course, also social conditions that enable state-capitalism. 
Political systems in which the state continuously has been playing a more 
active role are more prone to state-capitalism. Hofstede-style communitarian 
societies like Scandinavian countries also live better with state-capitalism; 
however, these tend to mount pressure regarding transparency, regulations 
and outcomes. Authoritarian-ruled countries show remarkable high levels of 
state-capitalism, but democracy does not prevent it; many democratically 
governed countries also display this inclination. 
It has been observed (Goldstein 1999) that democracies like Brazil or India 
do not achieve the same outcomes under state-capitalism than authoritarian 
countries like Korea (at the height of its state-capitalism), China or semi-
democratic Singapore. Often, this difference has been explained away recurring 
to some cultural background (Robinson 2004). However, another response is 
possible. 
The most important difference between the before-mentioned countries is 
that the former are authoritarian countries and the latter democracies. Without 
going into the merits of each form of government, usually monistic systems do 
not have to account to some or all stakeholders of society, that means, 
authoritarian government is not bound to constituency. This brings the 
advantage of not having to serve interests of organized groups and therefore 
being free to serve the interests of the state as a whole (however, this does not 
imply a normative good). In other words, if the state-capitalistic government’s 
aim is to provide for economic growth, promote infant industries, secure 
stability and from this basis on increase the prosperity of a country as a whole 
(while increasing its power as a state-agent), then it is better-off if it can operate 
without a distraction from the objective. Achieving all these goals as a whole is 
likely –but far from certain – to improve the lives of the other market agents in 
average but not of every one. If, however, particular groups exercise pressure 
on government to privilege them over others in society, then the state-
capitalistic entity will use its powers not to achieve before-mentioned goals but 
to serve particularistic interests creating so a second-order market-distortion 
(state-capitalism itself being the first-order-distortion). 
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Democratic states are more likely to have to serve interests of particular 
constituencies. In this case, democratically-elected state-capitalistic 
governments are also more likely to use their apparatus in order to serve these 
special interest groups. State-capitalism, which as such does not prioritize 
efficiency, loses even more efficiency by catering individual constituencies. This 
allows explaining why “democratic state-capitalistic countries” like Brazil, 
India or France consistently underperform free economies as well as 
authoritarian state-capitalisms. 
Inversely, it is not claimed that these authoritarian countries are free from 
second-order-distortions. Within the system of state-capitalism there is still 
enough room for rent-seeking behavior. However, authoritarian state-
capitalists are still freer in the interests to serve and their foremost aim, 
establishing the state as main agent, can only be achieved by a successful state-
capitalism. Therefore, these states tend to concentrate of achieving the aim. And 
this explains the relative success – in average – of countries like China, 
Indonesia and Singapore. However, this relative success comes at a price and 
the price is the lost in efficiency and innovation. With the time, even 
authoritarian state-capitalists will have to cater for the needs of their 
population which ends in larger welfare-states and often very expensive 
investments without a perspective for return on investment. Again, a Chinese 
example: Investment in infrastructure narrows the gap in efficiency between 
regions making investments overall less efficient. China's investments suffer 
from low efficiency and they are being directed to still less efficient regions 
with the grow West strategy. 
To sum this section up: departing from the theoretical considerations for 
state-capitalism very specific economic policies are developed. These policies 
may create market distortions because the theoretical framework of state-
capitalism shows some important problems like assuming epistemic privileges 
and the absence of self-interested action. The most important problem, 
however, is the lack of concern with efficiency. On a social level, state-
capitalism may work better under authoritarian rule than in democracies but 
remains prone to problems. 
 
4. A challenge – to whom? 
State-capitalism seems a success story. Most “western” governments look 
with envy towards China and some openly think about imitating it. Yet a close 
look at the model shows its weaknesses. When the government favors one lot 
of companies, the others suffer. State giants soak up capital and talent that 
might have been used better by private companies. State companies use capital 
less efficiently than private ones, and grow more slowly (Schneider 2012). State 
companies are good at copying others, partly because they can use the 
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government's clout to get hold of their technology; but as they have to produce 
ideas of their own they will become less competitive. State-owned companies 
make a few big bets rather than lots of small ones; the world's great centers of 
innovation are usually networks of small start-ups. And: state-capitalism does 
not guarantee stability. State-capitalism works well only when directed by a 
competent state. Many Asian countries have a strong mandarin culture; South 
Africa and Brazil do not. Coal India is hardly an advertisement for efficiency. 
And everywhere state-capitalism favors well-connected insiders over 
innovative outsiders. 
Rising powers have always used the state to initiate growth: Japan and 
South Korea in the 1950s or Germany in the 1870s or even the United States 
after the war of independence. But these countries have, over time, invariably 
found that the system has limits. It may take many years, however, for the 
model's weaknesses to become obvious; and, in the meantime, it is likely to 
cause different types of problems. State-capitalist governments, as 
simultaneously regulators and investors, can be capricious, with little regard 
for minority shareholders. Another concern is the impact of the model on the 
global trading system. Ensuring that trade is fair is harder when some 
companies enjoy the support, overt or covert, of a national government. 
For emerging countries state-capitalism has an obvious appeal. It gives them 
the clout that private-sector companies would take years to build. But its 
dangers outweigh its advantages. Both for their own sake, and in the interests 
of world trade, the practitioners of state-capitalism need to start unwinding 
their holdings in favored companies and handing them over to private 
investors. Failing to do so may result in inefficiency, being caught in the 
“middle income trap” or even losing momentum in development. 
There are, of course, some advantages of state-capitalism. It enables 
countries to learn know-how, to accumulate capital, to transfer management 
skills and even to form financial markets. It guarantees some sort of economic 
stability and lastly, it enables states to become and remain global players. All 
these advantages are countered by their price. State-capitalism normally shows 
a lack of capacity for independent innovation, low average returns on 
investment of state owned enterprises, lost in total factor productivity (total 
factor productivity of private companies is twice that of state companies) and 
the socialization of costs. Huge state-owned companies gobbling capital for 
inefficient investment and the low productivity also account for the “middle 
income trap” in China, Brazil and other practitioners of state-capitalism 
(Schneider 2012). Lastly, state-capitalist countries tend to display over-
regulation and problems in governance: corruptions, throwing good money 
after bad money, privileges for well-connected insiders over innovative 
outsiders are just some of them. Even if it is to be accepted that in the beginning 
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of a life-cycle efficiency can be overlooked, as an economy matures it will have 
to stand up to international competition, therefore life-cycle management is 
crucial for state-capitalism. However, the managers of state-capitalists have – as 
insiders – an interest in delaying life-cycle advancements, which on its own is a 
challenge to the overall goals of state-capitalism itself. 
In sum, state-capitalism may be a short-term challenge for free-market 
systems but is a long-term challenge for the state-capitalists themselves. 
 
5. Conclusions 
State-capitalism is an economic system in which governments manipulate 
market outcomes for political purposes. Governments embrace state-capitalism 
because it serves political as well as economic purposes—not because it’s the 
most efficient means of generating prosperity. It puts vast financial resources 
within the control of state officials, allowing them access to cash that helps 
safeguard their domestic political capital and, in many cases, increases their 
leverage on the international stage. But state-capitalism also stems the rise of 
globalization, because to varying degrees it hampers the flow of ideas, 
information, people, money, goods, and services within countries and across 
international borders. 
However, recently state-capitalism seems to be the winning strategy in 
globalization. In the last five years, state-capitalistic nations consistently fared 
better than (so-called) free-markets. This makes state-capitalism a challenge on 
several levels. First, it asks deep questions concerning the Western 
understanding of capitalism and freedom. ‘Western’ philosophy usually links 
democracy, liberty and entrepreneurship; the Chinese model questions this 
link. Second, many economists consider private investment to be more efficient, 
flexible and innovative than state-run enterprises; how, then, is Chinese state-
entrepreneurism working so well? Third, what is different now from what 
happened in the state-capitalistic versions of Latin-America and other Asian 
countries (they didn’t work, after all)? Fourth, why did South Korea abandon 
the state-capitalist system at the height of its bloom? Fifth, how should a state-
run system develop, if the state-machinery does not? 
An assessment of state-capitalism should be done in the light of three 
factors: 
1. There is no clear dividing line between state-owned and private 
companies. “Private” champions such as Huawei, the telecoms giant, have 
repeatedly been given government help. This makes it hard to produce precise 
calculations about the productivity of the two sectors.  
2. Ownership is not the only thing in play. Some of the problems, and the 
successes, of state-capitalism have more to do with rapid development than 
with state ownership.  
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3. Everything depends on context. It is quite possible for state-capitalism to 
work well in some areas (e.g., infrastructure) and badly in others (e.g., 
consumer goods). It is also possible for it to boost growth at one stage of 
development and impede it at another. 
The advantages of state-capitalism are its enabling of fast development, 
learning and thus making an economy richer. Its disadvantages are: companies 
become less efficient, the rate of return of capital is low and the capability of 
innovation seems hampered. State-capitalism functions in authoritarian states 
because there is no promise of personal gains for individuals. 
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